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Abstract 
A defining characteristic of second-order elections is that voters base their decision on 
considerations that were developed for a different policy level. Therefore, this kind of 
elections does not contribute to the quality of democratic representation. Municipal elections 
are often considered as second-order elections. In this article we use data from an exit poll 
(n=4,591) held during the 2012 municipal elections in Belgium. Results suggest that although 
voters predominantly invoke local aspects as determining their vote choice, still three 
quarters votes for the same party locally as for federal elections. Among voters who deviate 
from their federal party preference, knowing local candidates and concern about local policy 
issues are the main sources of deviation. The conclusion therefore is that local candidates do 
make a difference and contribute strongly to the salience of electoral decisions on the local 
level. 
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1. Introduction 
The principle of free and fair elections is based predominantly on the mechanism of electoral 
accountability: at elections office holders are held accountable. However, the principle of 
accountability cannot always be guaranteed in second-order elections, when voters do not 
judge the track record of that specific level of government. It was shown that local elections 
hardly contribute to this process of electoral accountability in the US, often due to a lack of 
information about local politics (Berry and Howell 2007). Schakel and Jeffery (2013), 
however, recently argued that it is all too easily assumed that national elections are first-order 
elections, while all elections at a lower geographical level are second-order elections.  
 
Second-order elections are characterised by the fact that ‘many voters cast their votes in these 
elections not only as a result of conditions obtaining within the specific context of the 
second-order arena, but also on the basis of factors in the main political arena of the nation’ 
(Reif and Schmitt 1980, 9). In most electoral research, European Parliament elections are 
used as a prime example for this phenomenon, as numerous voters are guided by national 
considerations. As a result voters do not hold their members of the European Parliament 
accountable for what they have done in the European Parliament (van der Eijk, Franklin, and 
Marsh 1996).  
 
In most countries, elections for local authorities too will be considered as second-order 
elections (Berry and Howell 2007; Cutler 2008; Webber et al. 2014). Heath et al. (1999, 409) 
qualified this statement to some extent by labelling local elections as ‘elections from one-
and-three-quarter order’. Even though national considerations affect the local vote choice, it 
is argued that arena-specific factors play a more important role in local than in European 
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parliament elections (Heath et al. 1999, Rallings and Thrasher 2005). The question remains, 
therefore, whether local elections fit in this specific definition of second-order elections, or 
whether voters take into consideration local voting motives. 
 
The aim of the current study is to investigate to what extent local elections in Belgium are 
characterised by elements of first- and second-order elections. Based on a representative exit 
poll survey of the 2012 local elections in Belgium, our main research question is whether 
voters follow their federal party preferences (as we would expect in typical second-order 
elections) or whether local considerations lead them to deviate from this preference. The 
features of the municipal councils election in Belgium make it a most-likely case of second 
order elections. First, the same parties compete in federal elections in a vast majority of 
municipalities (Wauters, Verlet, and Ackaert 2012). Second, since 2007 Belgium was 
confronted with an extended period of political instability, and political parties strongly 
politicised these elections as part of the ongoing power-struggle at the federal level.  
 
In this article, we first present an overview of the literature on second-order elections and the 
second-order characteristics of local elections. Next, we elaborate on factors that can incite 
taking into account context-specific considerations in the vote choice process. We 
subsequently present the data, the 2012 PartiRep exit poll, and the methodology used. This 
section is followed by a presentation of the results and we end with some thoughts for further 
research. 
 
2. The problem of second-order elections 
Within democratic theory different mechanisms are described that ensure a linkage between 
voters’ preferences and politicians representation of these preferences through policy choices. 
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Voters can evaluate retrospectively the performance of parties and politicians and 
subsequently hold them accountable (Prezworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999, Mansbridge 
2003). Voters reward and punish incumbents and ‘throw the rascals out’ (Miller and 
Wattenberg 1985; Downs 1957). In contrast, prospective voting theory assumes that voters 
assess party programs and subsequently decide what party to vote for (Norris 1997, 
Prezworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). Both roads towards representation, however, are 
hampered if issues and performances of parties at another level of governance influence vote 
choices. In that case, voters are no longer able to clearly express their evaluation of past 
performance or their expectations on future policy on that specific level of government 
(Norris 1997). 
 
In this study, we investigate electoral accountability at local elections as research indicates 
that information on federal politics might be more readily available than information on local 
politics (Put, Maddens, and Smulders 2014; Lefevere and Van Aelst 2014; Webber et al. 
2014). We should note that electoral accountability is not the only factor to assess the 
democratic legitimacy of local government. Several studies assessed the effect of citizen 
involvement on political trust and democratic legitimacy at the local level (e.g. Geissel 2009; 
Michels and De Graaf 2010). Both participation and accountability can be considered as key 
factors in the creation of democratic legitimacy. Given the data at hand, however, the scope 
of the present analysis remains limited to the quality of local democracy by focusing on the 
quality of accountability at the local level. 
 
Within the research tradition on second-order elections different defining elements of 
‘second-order’ elections are referred to: the turn out rate, the stakes of the elections and the 
voting motives. First, low voter turnout is considered an important indicator of the second-
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order nature of an election and found to be lower in elections that were considered second-
order (Heath et al. 1999; Lefevere and Van Aelst 2014; Rallings and Trasher 2005). Second, 
studies on second-order elections also questioned voters directly on the importance of the 
different levels of governance (Lefevere and Van Aelst 2014). Third, differences in vote 
choices between elections at different levels of governance can be another indicator. Small 
and newer parties tend to obtain larger vote shares in second-order elections than in national 
elections and parties in the national government tend to lose votes in second-order elections 
(Marsh 1998; Reif 1984; van der Eijk, Franklin, and Manin 1996). The losses of parties in 
government can reflect a natural popularity cycle, especially second-order elections in the 
middle of the electoral cycle often reflect a low popularity of parties in office. Further, Reif 
and Schmitt (1980) argued that second-order elections have no immediate consequences for 
the composition of the national government, which allows expressing discontent when 
voting. Rather than voting for parties that have a chance of gaining seats or even office, 
voters can ‘vote with the heart’ in a second-order context (Heath et al. 1999). Finally, voters 
can use their vote in second-order elections to send a signal to parties and to comment on 
their performance (van der Eijk et al. 1996). In this study, we provide a brief overview of the 
turnout level and perceived importance of the 2012 Belgian local elections. Subsequently, we 
investigate in depth whether federal considerations influence local vote choices thereby 
serving to signal the ‘political mood of the moment’ to the national political leaders 
(Anderson and Ward 1996). 
 
3. Second-order local elections? 
The question whether local elections should be considered as pure second-order elections is 
debated. Previous studies revealed that local elections cannot be equated with EU elections in 
terms of the second-order election framework. Studies on the UK and the Netherlands 
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indicated that local elections take a middle position in terms of the first- and second- order 
election framework. Regarding voter turnout, for example, rates for local elections are 
generally lower than national elections but higher than EU elections (Heath et al., 1999; 
Lefevere and Van Aelst 2014; Rallings and Trasher 2005). This observation led Heath et al. 
to label local elections as elections of one-and-three-quarter order. 
 
Moreover, empirical studies show that in a context of multilevel governance, voters can and 
do develop party allegiances specific to the particular political context at stake (Clarke and 
Stewart 1987). In addition, only few local competences are part of large ideological debates 
(Jennings and Niemi 1966). As a consequence, ideological preferences guiding vote choices 
for higher levels of governance are less relevant when choosing local representatives. 
Moreover, personal ties with local candidates are assumed to strongly affect local vote 
choices and could therefore render national preferences less relevant (Fuentes and Villodres 
2010). As Jennings and Niemi (1966, 89) stated: ‘The impact of “friends-and-neighbors” 
politics and local traditions are sufficiently great in small- to medium sized towns to create a 
disproportionate amount of both partisan and Independent deviation at this level’. This does 
not mean friends, neighbors and local political contacts are absent at the national level. In 
effect, vote-seeking goals of federal Members of Parliament often result in strong 
investments in constituency service and personal contacts (Fenno 1978; André, Gallagher, 
and Sandri, 2014). 
 
In sum, we can distinguish two determinants of vote choice causing voters to deviate from 
their federal political preferences in municipal elections. First, local issues cannot always be 
interpreted in terms of (national) ideological positions. As a consequence, we expect voters of 
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whom the vote choice is driven by local considerations to deviate more from their federal 
vote intention: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Voters who take into account local voting motives are more likely to deviate 
from their federal party preference. 
 
Second, ‘friends-and-neighbors’-politics is considered to be of foremost importance in a local 
electoral context and trends toward personalization of politics might even reinforce this 
motive (Wauters, Verlet, and Ackaert 2012; Karvonen 2010). Therefore, we expect voters 
whose vote choice is determined by local candidates to deviate more from their federal vote 
intention: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Voters who take into account the appeal of local candidates, are more likely to 
deviate from their federal party preference. 
 
4. Who deviates? 
We concentrate on local party choices that deviate from federal party preferences. The 
reasons therefore are largely pragmatic. Some voters might take into account local policy 
issues or candidates before concluding that they should still vote for the same party for 
municipal and federal elections. Analytically it is almost impossible to distinguish these 
voters from those who simply follow their federal party preference in local elections, thereby 
arriving at a congruent set of party preferences. Therefore, the analysis will be concentrated 
on non-congruent voters, with different local and federal party preferences. This allows for 
sufficient analytical leverage to investigate the importance of local issues and candidates. 
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This is a rather conservative test, given that we can be confident that this group has different 
voting motivations for the local and the federal level. 
 
Investigating non-congruent party preferences, the role of political sophistication is 
important. Most empirical studies suggest that sophisticated voters are better able to 
distinguish policy levels. First, voting for different parties for different levels of governance 
could imply that voters take into account factors specific for the electoral context at stake. 
Such deliberative choices necessitate voters to be informed about the competences at all 
levels of governance (Campbell and Miller 1957, Heath et al. 1999). Second, voting for 
different parties for different offices can result from strategic considerations of voters. In a 
mixed electoral system, splitting tickets on a single ballot can be a way of indicating one’s 
preferred coalition (Karp et al. 2002; Schoen 1999) or  signalling that a balance of power 
between parties is needed (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2004). Empirical research indicates that a 
substantial group of the ticket-splitters are indeed sophisticated voters who act strategically 
(Karp et al. 2002, Rallings and Trasher 2003, Schoen 1999). Third, most authors assume that 
rising levels of political sophistication lead to a process of partisan dealignment (Dalton and 
Wattenberg 2002). Partisanship in general offers a heuristic short cut to electoral decision 
making, as voters simply can rely on the cues provided by political parties and no longer have 
to seek information on all policy issues (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). High levels of political 
sophistication, however, render the need for this kind of partisan cues largely obsolete, and it 
can be assumed that voters with higher levels of political sophistication are more likely to use 
forms of split-ticket voting to express their opinions. It has to be mentioned that high 
politically sophisticated voters were previously found to be more likely to be partisans 
(Albright 2009; Marthaler 2008). Most empirical research, however, demonstrates that voters 
who split their tickets at different levels of governance are more politically sophisticated and 
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act strategically (Karp et al. 2002; Rallings and Trasher 2005; Schoen 1999). These 
arguments, therefore, lead to the expectation that especially the highly politically 
sophisticated voters will deviate from their federal preference in local elections: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Politically sophisticated voters are more likely to deviate from their federal 
party preference. 
 
Importantly, supply side considerations too have to be considered, as the number of nature of 
the parties running for office differs in each municipality. Especially in the smaller 
municipalities, national parties might not compete, form a pre-electoral coalition or use a 
local label. Furthermore, particularly in the smaller municipalities local candidates and their 
closeness to the voters can overrule national party preferences. 
 
5. The case of the Belgian 2012 local elections  
As far as we know, studies applying the theoretical framework of second-order elections to 
local elections are scarce (Cutler 2008, Heath et al. 1999) and indicate that these elections are 
‘less’ second-order than EU elections as arena-specific factors tend to be important for 
explaining voting behaviour (Cutler 2008).  
 
We aim to contribute to this literature by studying the case of the 2012 Belgian local 
elections. This election offers a most likely case for local elections to be second order. If 
these elections are not second order, the probability that Belgian local elections are second-
order is small. Local politics has become more professionalised over time and in a vast 
majority of municipalities national political parties compete in elections (De Rynck et al. 
2010, Verhelst, Reynaert, and Steyvers 2013). This nationalisation of local politics, the fact 
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that the elections were held simultaneously in all 589 Belgian municipalities and that these 
were the first elections after the 2010-2011 political crisis (Hooghe 2012) strengthened the 
idea of the 2012 elections being a referendum about the performances of the federal 
government. The framing of the opposition parties strengthened this idea. The crisis was 
caused by the growing apart of the two language communities. After the 2010 elections, 
linguistic tensions rendered the formation of a federal government an almost insurmountable 
task. After 541 days of negotiations, a government took office in December 2011 (Hooghe 
2012).  
 
National parties generally consider local elections strategically important (Wille and 
Deschouwer 2007). Belgian municipalities have a distinct autonomy despite their limited 
overall budget and competences compared to other European countries (Deschouwer 2009, 
Hooghe et al. 2010). Local governments can raise their own taxes and they are the largest 
public investors in the country (Hooghe et al., 2010; Vermeir and Heyndels 2006). Media 
coverage for local elections is less intensive compared to elections at higher levels of 
governance. To the extent that local elections receive coverage from national media outlets, 
the focus tends to be on a limited number of large cities or municipalities where federal or 
regional political leaders run for election (Ackaert , Reynaert, and Van Aelst 2007). Political 
leaders regularly accumulate offices on various levels of government and this too might 
render local elections a national test of popularity (Geys and Heyndels 2006).  
 
More generally, local representatives are elected every six years and seats are allocated 
proportionally (Imperiali method). Each of the 589 municipalities in Belgium includes a 
single constituency and depending on its size between 7 and 55 local representatives have to 
be elected. The party or coalition of parties obtaining a majority of seats in the local council 
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can form a local government (i.e. a College of the Mayor and Aldermen) (Put, Maddens, and 
Smulders 2014). The list system for local elections can be characterised as ‘semi-open’ and 
voters can cast either a list vote or preferential votes for one or multiple candidates within 
one list. Traditionally, a substantial amount of preferential votes are cast in local elections 
(Wauters, Verlet, and Ackaert 2012; Marien, Wauters, and Schouteden forthcoming).  At all 
levels of government, participation in the election is compulsory. 
 
 
6. Data and methods 
We use the data of the PartiRep exit poll 2012, a representative voter survey organised in the 
context of the October 2012 municipal elections in Belgium. The exit poll format implies that 
voters were interviewed immediately after leaving the polling station. The main advantage is 
that a bias due to recall errors and flawed memories is limited to a minimum. Furthermore, 
answers in an exit poll survey are not influenced by the election outcome (Carsey and 
Jackson 2001; Wright 1993). Respondents provide information about their party choice and 
voting motives before knowing the election results. 
 
The sample design consisted of a three-step procedure. First, 40 of the 589 municipalities 
were randomly selected within regionally based socio-economic clusters ensuring sufficient 
regional and socio-economic variation. Subsequently, polling stations were randomly 
selected in each municipality and the number of stations in a municipality was in proportion 
to its number of inhabitants. Finally, interviewers had to invite each fifth voter leaving the 
polling station to participate to the survey.
1
 Fieldwork resulted in a dataset of 4,591 randomly 
                                                        
1
. Interviewers were at their assigned polling station for the full period polling stations were opened. This 
implies they were interviewing from 8am to 1pm where paper ballots where used, to 3pm where votes were cast 
electronically and to 4pm in municipalities in the Brussels capital region. 
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selected respondents and the overall response rate was 37.9%, which is in line with this 
specific survey format (Dassonneville, Marien and Hooghe 2012). 
 
The dependent variable measuring deviant voting was constructed by combining information 
from the respondents’ reported local vote choice and their vote intention for hypothetical 
federal elections.
2
 Ideally we would have had local and federal elections on the same day to 
compare vote choices for both levels, which was unfortunately not the case on 14 October 
2012. Therefore, we have to rely on a recall question of respondents 2010 vote or on a 
hypothetical question. We believe a hypothetical question offers a better proxy as recall 
questions are plagued by a substantial measurement error because respondents do not recall 
or report their actual vote (van der Eijk and Niemöller 2008; Waldahl and Aardal 2000). 
Moreover, within the previous two years voters can have changed parties. As the 2009 and 
2010 elections were rather volatile, a question on previous voting behaviour was not relevant 
to understand the 2012 electoral dynamics. Therefore, we believe a hypothetical question on 
one’s federal vote is a better proxy for federal vote choice than a recall question. Yet it has to 
be acknowledged that asking about hypothetical federal elections immediately after voters 
have voted for local elections might inflate the percentage of congruent voters. The 
advantage of the procedure is that if respondents indicate that they did deviate from their 
federal party preference, they indeed consciously expressed a distinct preference for the local 
level.  
 
Comparing local vote choices with federal vote intentions, a number of difficulties arise. 
First, at a local level, party lists and party names are quite diffuse with joint lists of multiple 
parties or national parties running under local labels (Heyerick and Steyvers 2013). We 
                                                        
2
. Question wording for the federal vote intention was the following: ‘What party would you vote for if today 
federal elections were being held’. 
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carefully analysed the exact composition of all local lists and assigned as many local lists as 
possible to a national party.
3
 Second, a number of mostly smaller national parties do not run 
for election in each single municipality making congruent voting impossible (Wille and 
Deschouwer 2007).. For 3% of the respondents in the sample the party of their national 
preference did not run in their municipality, not even under a different label or on a joint list, 
therefore these respondents were excluded from further analysis. 
 
The dependent variable, deviant voting, is binary with value ‘1’ if respondents deviated from 
their federal vote choice in the municipal elections. Consequently, the analyses take the form 
of logistic regression analyses. The data structure is hierarchical with individuals nested in 40 
municipalities, therefore, random intercept models are used (Snijders and Bosker 1999).   
 
Vote choice determinants were measured by an open-ended question asking respondents to 
explain in their own words why they voted for the list they just casted a vote for. For 
investigating vote choice heuristics, open-ended questions are considered the most 
appropriate method because respondents are not restrained to a limited number of pre-
imposed categories (Lefevere 2011). The answers were coded in 16 different categories of 
vote choice heuristics (Lefevere 2011). On a number of items, coders could differentiate 
whether or not the local level was referred to. Regarding issues, for example, policy themes 
with a clear reference to the local context were labelled ‘local issue’ while references to 
policy themes pertaining to national or regional politics (as e.g, state reform) were labelled 
‘national issue’. Similarly, references to ‘local’ and ‘national’ candidates were distinguished 
with references to personally knowing a particular candidate or living in the same 
                                                        
3
. Voters who indicated to have voted for a joint list of socialists and greens, for example, are only coded as 
deviating from their federal preference if they indicated neither the socialist nor the green party for their federal 
vote intention. 
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neighbourhood as a candidate coded as ‘local candidate’. In contrast, if a respondent 
motivated his/her vote by referring to a nationally known politician who was not a candidate 
in the respondent’s municipality, this was coded as ‘national candidate’. As soon as the 
candidate referred to was effectively on a local list – regardless of whether or not this 
candidate is or was active on other levels of government – this reference was coded as ‘local 
candidate’.  Coders could use up to three codes to categorise respondents’ vote choices. As an 
indicator of inter-coder reliability, the Cohen’s κ-value for the code assigned to a response 
was 0.70 (Dassonneville, Marien, and Hooghe 2012; Landis and Koch 1977). For the 
multivariate analyses we focus on the categories ‘local issues or policy’ and ‘local candidate’ 
as these are the clearest expression of local voting motives.  
 
Testing the third hypothesis requires a measure of political sophistication. In the literature, a 
number of operationalisations for political sophistication are used. Questioning political 
knowledge was impossible for 40 different electoral contexts, therefore, a number of 
frequently used proxy variables were included (Dalton 1984, 2012). Particularly, we include 
education level and political interest (a combination of reported interest in local and national 
politics, both on a 0-10 scale and combined into a 0-10-sum-scale). 
 
We control for socio-demographics in the analyses by including respondents’ sex, age and 
the region of the municipality (Flanders, Wallonia or Brussels). Voters who locate 
themselves at ideological extremes were found to have more stable vote choices than voters 
in the ideological centre as extreme voters have fewer options to deviate. A centrist voter can 
move to the left or the right, while the ceiling effect inhibits an extreme left voter to move 
further to the left (Dassonneville 2012). Therefore, we control for the impact of voters’ 
ideological position on deviant voting by a variable of ‘ideological extremeness’ that is 
  
 
14 
constructed by recoding respondents’ self-placement on a 0-10 left-right scale. Extremeness 
is operationalised as the distance between the voter and the middle position of ‘5’. Both 
extreme left and extreme right voters, therefore, can obtain a maximum score of ‘5’ on 
extremeness. Finally, we control for the occurrence of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) 
between political parties at the local level. In several municipalities political parties took part 
in the elections with joint lists, e.g. between the Socialist and Green party. To control for the 
existence of these PECs, we created a variable that measured voting on a local PEC. We 
expect that PECs have a broad appeal and attract voters beyond the constituent parties, 
leading PEC voters to deviate more from their national party than voters who did not vote for 
a PEC (Golder 2006). In addition, we created a variable that measured whether one’s national 
party took part in the elections as a PEC. While a PEC can have a broad appeal, voters can 
also decide to desert their national party as a result of this joint list (Gschwend and Hooghe 
2008). Descriptive statistics for all independent variables are listed in Appendix 1. 
 
7. Results 
Before investigating deviant voting behaviour in municipal elections, we briefly describe two 
other commonly cited aspects of second-order elections: the turnout levels and importance 
attached to the level of governance. 
 
First, turnout rates at elections are considered an indicator of the importance voters attach to a 
policy level and therefore of the second order nature of elections. Despite compulsory voting 
laws, a proportion of the electorate does not turn out to vote. Looking at the turnout rates in 
elections at different levels of governance, therefore, gives an indication of the ‘order’ of 
different elections. Figure 1 shows the evolution of turnout rates in Belgium for the federal, 
European and local elections. The turnout rates for EU-elections are systematically lower, 
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while the local level turnout rates are at about the same level or higher than the federal 
elections.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As compulsory voting could hinder a comparison of turnout rates for different levels of 
governance, we verified whether the same pattern emerges from survey data on voters’ 
likelihood to turn out to vote for different types of election if compulsory voting were 
abolished. This results in a similar pattern; while in terms of turnout EU elections are second-
order in Belgium, this is not the case for local elections (Table 1). 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
A similar conclusion is reached if the stakes of the levels of government are investigated. 
Respondents in the 2012 exit poll rated the local level as most important for their personal 
lives (Table 2). The difference to the federal level is marginal, while the EU once more is 
clearly considered of lower order. However, these data were collected in the context of local 
elections, which is likely to make the local context more salient than other levels of 
governance. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In sum, in terms of turnout and the less at stake-argument, Belgian local elections do not fit 
the second-order election framework. In contrast to previous research in other countries, there 
are no indications of the local level taking a middle position between the federal and 
European levels either. The question therefore arises whether the same conclusion could be 
reached when investigating another defining characteristic of second-order elections i.e. 
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voting choices and voting motives.  
 
First, we analyse the extent to which voters took local-specific factors into account. In Table 
3 we present the extent to which different categories of vote choice heuristics were 
mentioned. The local context clearly dominated the choices voters made in October 2012. 
The most often mentioned heuristic for the vote choice is ‘knowing a candidate on a 
particular list’, followed by issues that deal with government and opposition at a local level 
and ‘local issues’. When explicitly asked about voting motives, voters clearly emphasise 
local voting motives. References to the party or to ideological motivations are less common. 
This answering pattern shows voters take the local level seriously and claim their voting 
behaviour is determined by local considerations. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Next, we investigate the extent to which voters deviate from their national party choice. From 
all voters who could vote for their preferred national party, 73.6% effectively did so (Table 
4). While most voters invoke local vote considerations, almost three quarters of all voters 
vote for the same party locally and federally. One quarter of the electorate deviated and voted 
for a different party at the local level than they would do for federal elections, even though 
their preferred national party was on the ballot in their municipality. This is more or less in 
line with the findings for the British 1994 local elections, where Heath et al. (1999) found 
one fifth of the electorate to deviate. The fact that about a quarter of all voters deviates from 
the federal choice results in sufficient cases to investigate why they did so. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
  
 
17 
 
To investigate the causes of deviant voting behaviour, we present the results of multilevel 
logistic regressions (Table 5). First, we constructed an intercept-only model to assess the 
amount of variance at the municipality-level. With only 3% of the variance in deviant voting 
situated at the municipality-level, it is clear that we should look at the individual level to 
explain deviant voting behaviour (ρ-coefficientintercept-only model = 0.029). A tendency to deviate 
from a federal party preference in local elections is spread rather evenly across municipalities 
and independent of municipality characteristics. Therefore, we do not examine in-depth the 
factors that are situated at the supply side.
4
 
 
In Model 1, we investigate the effect of the socio-demographic control variables sex, age and 
the region of residence. Voters in Walloon municipalities are significantly less likely to 
deviate from their federal preference than voters in Flanders. The results do not indicate 
significant effects of sex or age on deviant voting behaviour. Overall, including these socio-
demographics contributes to a small decrease of the log likelihood statistic of the intercept-
only model. In addition (Model 2), the results show in line with expectations, PEC-voters 
being more likely to deviate from their national party than voters who have not voted for a 
PEC. Further, the results in Model 3 show that there is no significant difference in the 
likelihood to deviate from one’s national party between voters whose party took part in the 
municipal election as a PEC and voters whose party took part in the election independently. 
In sum, it seems that voters follow their national party into local pre-electoral coalitions but a 
pre-electoral coalition can also increase the likelihood that voters who would otherwise not 
                                                        
4 We compared the fit of the intercept-only model to the fit of an ordinary logistic regression that does not take 
into account random variation at the level of municipalities. This likelihood ratio statistic is 19.63 and has a p-
value (for one degree of freedom) of 0.000. Consequently, we have to reject the null hypothesis of no between-
municipality variation in deviant voting and therefore we use multilevel modeling techniques. 
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vote for one of the parties in a coalition deviate from their national vote and choose the local 
PEC.  
 
In model 4 we include the measures of voters’ reported choice heuristics. The reference 
category is all not local-specific heuristics, which we compare to mentioning local issues or 
local candidates as the main voting consideration. Both referring to local issues and local 
candidates significantly increases the probability of a deviant vote. Consequently, we find 
evidence supporting our first two hypotheses. Comparing the size of the coefficients indicates 
that referring to a local candidate has a more profound impact than taking into account local 
issues. It seems that ‘friends-and-neighbours’-politics are more important for understanding 
why voters deviate than local issues. Even in a densely populated and urbanised country like 
Belgium, local politics still proves to be, to a large extent, a matter of friends, neighbours and 
local personal contacts. 
 
Finally, we test the hypothesis that the higher politically sophisticated deviate more. The 
results indicate that the lower educated are significantly less likely to deviate compared to 
respondents with a middle level of education. The highly educated, however, are not 
significantly different from the middle group. The effect of political interest is not significant. 
Our third hypothesis, therefore, is only partly confirmed. Voters that place themselves at the 
extremes of a 0-10 left-right scale are less likely to vote for a different party in municipal 
elections than in federal elections. Furthermore, the effects for the vote choice heuristics are 
robust to controlling for ideology and political sophistication.  
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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8. Discussion 
Our aim was to investigate whether local elections should be considered as second-order 
elections, where local political considerations play only a limited role in determining vote 
choice. Therefore, we investigated the nature of local elections and the factors that influence 
voters to cast different local and federal votes using the case of the 2012 Belgian municipal 
election. 
 
When asked about their voting motives, a majority of respondents invoked local 
considerations, ranging from candidates over policy issues to an evaluation of the current 
municipal authorities. On a discursive level at least, voters do not consider municipal 
elections as second order elections, but they claim that they do pay attention to what goes on 
in their own local community. In their minds, local elections are not second-order elections. 
Despite these considerations, three quarters of all voters voted for the same party on the local 
and federal level. Self-evidently this does not imply that these voters simply follow their 
federal preference. They might still develop a vote decision based on local considerations that 
leads to the conclusion that they prefer the same party on both levels. 
 
A quarter of the voters deviate from their federal preference and remarkably local candidates 
were of crucial importance in explaining this deviation. The appeal of a local candidate has 
the potential to attract voters that otherwise would not vote for that specific party. While the 
saying that all politics is local is still valid, one might say that for municipal elections politics 
is indeed very local. Voters personally know the candidates on the list, which renders the 
election less dependent on national considerations. The impression is reinforced that local 
government is less a matter of ideology and more about personality, experience and personal 
networks. Future research should explore what the role of these local candidates is in federal 
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elections. The literature on personalisation states that ‘individual politicians have become 
more prominent at the expense of parties and collective identities’ (Karvonen 2010, 4). It 
would be interesting to investigate whether these local candidates also obtain votes in federal 
elections because there local positions rather than because he/she is a candidate from a given 
party. 
 
Besides knowing candidates on the list, choosing a particular party for the municipal 
elections because of local-specific issues was a significant determinant of voter deviance. 
Deviation seems to be the outcome of a well-considered choice and fits images of ideal-type 
democratic representation. This idea is further strengthened by the fact that higher educated 
were more likely than lower educated to prefer a different party in municipal and federal 
elections. 
 
This study has some limitations as it is focused on one municipal election in a single country. 
Even though our findings are in line with previous research on British local elections, more 
research is needed before we can claim that local elections are less second-order than 
supranational elections and that local candidates cause this difference. The currently available 
evidence, however, clearly suggests that the local level should not be dismissed too easily, as 
it can offer the context for a clear process of electoral accountability and democratic 
representation. In Belgium, at least, local elections are to a lesser extent second-order than is 
often assumed. Therefore, we concur with Schakel and Jeffery (2013) that it is all too easily 
assumed that national elections are first-order elections, while all elections at a lower 
geographical level are automatically labelled as second-order elections. In this line of 
reasoning, an interesting avenue for future research would be to supplement this study by 
research on the influence of local arenas on the federal level. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of turnout in federal, local and European elections in Belgium (1974-
2014) 
 
Sources: http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/ - http://verkiezingen2014.belgium.be/nl/eur/results - 
http://verkiezingen2007.belgium.be/nl/cha/results - Hennau and Ackaert 2013. 
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Table 1. Willingness to turn out to vote if compulsory voting were abolished (0 = never, 3 = always) 
 Mean score (0-3) 
EU parliament elections 1.64 [1.58;1.69] 
Federal parliament elections 1.85 [1.79;1.90] 
Regional parliament elections 1.90 [1.84;1.95] 
Local elections 2.09 [2.03;2.14] 
Source: PartiRep Belgian Election Study 2014. Data are weighted for socio-demographic characteristics. 95%-
confidence intervals in brackets. 
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Table 2. Mean rating of assessed importance on one’s personal life of decisions taken at different 
levels of governance 
 Mean (0 = not important at all; 10 = very 
important) 
Local council 6.04 [5.96;6.11] 
Regional parliament 5.87 [5.79;5.94] 
Federal parliament 5.95 [5.87;6.03] 
EU parliament 5.52 [5.43;5.60] 
Source: PartiRep exit poll 2012. Data are weighted for socio-demographic characteristics. 95%-confidence 
intervals in brackets. 
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TABLE 3 Most important reason for local vote choice 
 % respondents mentioning consideration 
(I know) a local candidate  21.1 
Local government and opposition 19.8 
Local issue 19.5 
Ideology of this party 11.1 
Party (in general)   9.9 
I am against something or someone     8.0 
I am a member of a particular (social) group   7.2 
Habitual voter for this party   5.6 
Followed peers   4.3 
A Politician (in general)   4.3 
National policy issue   2.7 
Constituency service of a candidate   1.4 
Size of the party (large or small)   1.4 
National government and opposition   1.0 
Media or vote test   0.7 
I support a particular national politician   0.6 
Data: PartiRep exit poll 2012. Answers to open-ended question on most important reason for vote choice. 
Multiple answers by respondent possible. 
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TABLE 4. Frequency of deviance 
 % of all voters % of voters who could 
vote for their federal 
preference 
Federal preference available 97.14 100.00 
Deviant vote 25.63 26.39 
Same vote 71.51  73.61 
Federal preference not available 2.86 - 
Total 100.00 
(N=3,444) 
100.00 
(N=3,348) 
Data : PartiRep exit poll 2012. Data are weighted for socio-demographic characteristics. 
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TABLE 5. Motives for a Deviant Party Choice on the Local Level 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Female  0.100 
(0.081) 
0.108 
(0.081) 
0.092 
(0.082) 
0.058 
(0.083) 
Age  -0.005 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Region (ref : Flanders)      
Brussels  -0.256 
(0.190) 
-0.062 
(0.203) 
-0.133 
(0.186) 
-0.119 
(0.180) 
Wallonia  -0.271* 
(0.136) 
-0.280 
(0.148) 
-0.217* 
(0.134) 
-0.183 
(0.131) 
Education level (ref : 
middle) 
     
Low     -0.267* 
(0.129) 
High     0.093 
(0.092) 
Political interest     -0.017 
(0.017) 
Ideological 
extremeness 
    -0.081** 
(0.028) 
Voting motive (ref : 
not local) 
     
Local issue or 
policy 
   0.365*** 
(0.086) 
0.355*** 
(0.090) 
Local candidate(s)    0.955*** 
(0.099) 
0.945*** 
(0.099) 
Voted on local PEC  0.312** 
(0.103) 
 0.309** 
(0.105) 
0.320** 
(0.105) 
National party in PEC   -0.167 
(0.110) 
  
Intercept -1.003*** 
(0.067) 
-0.812*** 
(0.145) 
-0.701*** 
(0.148) 
-1.301*** 
(0.157) 
-1.133*** 
(0.186) 
N voters/N 
municipalities 
3,243/40 3,243/40 3,243/40 3,243/40 3,243/40 
ρ 0.029 0.018 0.024 0.016 0.014 
Log likelihood -
1,859.831 
-
1,850.724 
-1,854.04 -1,803.850 -1,795.586 
Wald   19.08** 11.60* 112.16*** 126.82*** 
McFadden pseudo-R
2
  0.005 0.003 0.030 0.035 
Data : PartiRep exit poll 2012. Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 ; *** p<0.001. 
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APPENDIX 1. Descriptive statistics of independent variables  
 N Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Female 3,243 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Age 3,243 45.22 16.79 18 95 
Flemish region 3,243 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Brussels-capital region 3,243 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Walloon region 3,243 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Low level of education 3,243 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Middle level of education 3,243 0.38 0.48 0 1 
High level of education 3,243 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Political interest 3,243 6.10 2.51 0 10 
Ideological extremeness 3,243 1.65 1.55 0 5 
No local voting motive 3,243 0.57 0.49 0 1 
Local issue motive 3,243 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Local candidate motive 3,243 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Voted on local PEC 3,243 0.25 0.43 0 1 
National party in local PEC 3,243 0.22 0.41 0 1 
 
